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A social license for nuclear technologies 
Seth Hoedl, Ph.D., J.D.* 
Abstract  Nuclear energy technologies have the potential to help mitigate climate change.  However, these 
technologies face many challenges, including high costs, societal concern and opposition, and health, safety, 
environmental and proliferation risks.  Many companies and academic research groups are pursuing advanced 
designs, both fission and fusion-based, to address both costs and these risks.  This Chapter complements these 
efforts by analyzing how nuclear technologies can address societal concerns through the acquisition of a social 
license, a nebulous concept that represents “society’s consent” and that has been used to facilitate and improve a 
wide range of publicly and privately funded projects and activities subject to a range of regulatory oversight, 
including large industrial facilities, controversial genetic engineering research, and environmental management.  
Suggestions for public engagement and consent-based siting, two aspects of a social license, have been made before.  
This chapter modernizes these suggestions by briefly reviewing the social license and engagement literature.  The 
Chapter discusses, in the context of how to acquire a social license, the role of government regulation, the role of 
project proponents and government actors, and the role of four key principles, including engendering trust, 
transparency, meaningful public engagement, and protection of health, safety and the environment. Further, the 
Chapter uses the social license concept to explain why some nuclear waste repositories have succeeded while others 
languish and provides concrete recommendations for the deployment of new nuclear waste repositories and 
advanced power plants, both fission and fusion-based.  
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#.1 Introduction 
The benefits of nuclear technologies are well known and discussed elsewhere in this 
volume.  However, nuclear energy technologies can be difficult to implement.  They are often 
expensive, generate radioactive waste, and are inevitably connected to nuclear weapons, either 
directly through the materials and facilities used, or through knowledge transfer that can be 
redirected for weapons purposes.  As a consequence, nuclear energy technologies have long been 
controversial.  Power plants, waste repositories, enrichment and fuel processing facilities have 
long been met by legal and/or civil protest.1  Opposition is driven by, inter alia, concerns 
regarding capital expense, radiation exposure, radiation leaks, catastrophic accidents, waste 
stewardship, non-proliferation, terrorism,2 and fears that nuclear power exposes individuals to 
risks that they cannot control.3   
Despite the opposition to nuclear technologies, there is a need for new facilities 
associated with electric power production.  Regardless of nuclear power’s future, waste 
repositories need to be built and operated to deal with nuclear wastes that have accumulated 
since the dawn of the nuclear age.  More controversially, there may also be a need for new 
nuclear power plants.  Multiple studies suggest that humanity is unlikely to meet the climate 
change challenge without at least some role for nuclear power.4  More speculative nuclear 
technologies, such as fusion-based power plants, may play an even larger role than fission-based 
power plants due to inherent safety and waste advantages.  
The past challenges of building new nuclear waste repositories and fission-based power 
plants are well described in the literature.5  How to proceed in the future remains debated.  
Likely, many different strategies are needed.  Academics, companies and start-ups are actively 
 
1 For a review of early opposition in the 1970s, when nuclear power was expanding rapidly, see Bickerstaffe and 
Pearce 1980; Falk 1982.  Such challenges and protests continue to occur worldwide.  See The Economist 2013.  
2 Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980, pp 313–320.   
3 Mufson 1982, p 60., citing Otway et al. 1978.  
4 Both the International Energy Agency and the IPCC report that nuclear power production should at least double 
over the next thirty years in order for the earth’s temperature rise to remain below the 2˚C goal of the Paris 
Agreement.  Edenhofer 2014; International Energy Agency 2015.  
5 Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980; Slovic et al. 1991; Macfarlane and Ewing 2006.  
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pursuing new fission-based and fusion-based designs, with the intent of lowering costs and 
health, safety, environmental and proliferation risks.6  Others are pursuing regulatory reform to 
stream-line the legal licensing and approval process in order to lower development and 
deployment costs.7  Yet, a risk-reducing technical solution is unlikely sufficient to address 
societal concerns, as they are not based on quantifiable risks. 8  For example, despite the fact that 
coal mining and fossil fuel combustion arguably harm more people than nuclear,9 they do not 
elicit the same level of opposition.  Strategies other than technology development will be needed 
to address these concerns.  
One long recommended strategy to address concerns for nuclear projects is to adopt 
processes by which projects are approved or “sited” through some kind of public engagement.10  
However, the history of engagement is mixed and its ability to address concerns is greatly 
dependent on the nature of the engagement process.  While engagement has been successful in 
many contexts, as described below, there have also been failures that have led to disillusionment, 
by both the public and project proponents.  Early efforts in using engagement in the nuclear 
context were, in some cases, counter-productive and led to the cancellation of projects in which 
billions of dollars had already been invested.11  Commentators suggest that poorly run 
engagement can become a “talking shop” that creates ambiguities, delays decisive action, and 
breads cynicism.12  Engagement can also be coopted so as to push aside already marginalized 
groups.13  Nevertheless, many lessons have been learned regarding effective engagement in 
 
6 Lassiter 2018.  http://news.mit.edu/2018/mit-newly-formed-company-launch-novel-approach-fusion-power-0309; 
Sorbom et al. 2015.  
7 Nuclear Energy Institute 2018.  
8 Otway et al. 1978.  It has been long known that individuals ascribe more risk to radiation than experts ascribe, and 
more risk than other hazards.  This asymmetry, also generated by other hazard types, has been explained by the fact 
that radiation risk is perceived to be, inter alia, less voluntary, more catastrophic, and more likely to be fatal than 
other hazards.  Slovic 1987; Slovic 1996.  Further, the fact that radioactive material is invisible instills a sense of 
dread regarding nuclear accidents – radioactive accidents have no visible end.  Erikson 1990. 
9 Coal combustion alone is estimated to kill 366,000 people in China per year.  Wong 2016.  In contrast, the 
Chernobyl accident is expected to result in only 4,000 deaths in total.  International Atomic Energy Agency 2008. 
10 Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980, p 326.  
11 For example, Austria held a two-year long public debate and referendum regarding placing a completed nuclear 
plant into operation between 1976 and 1978.  At the conclusion of the debate, voters rejected the plant.  Mufson 
1982, pp 55–57.   
12 Reed 2008, p 2421. 
13 Reed 2008, p 2420. 
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fields other than nuclear, such as biomedical research, industrial facilities, and environmental 
management.  Best engagement practices have emerged.14   
This Chapter aims to briefly translate these best practices to the nuclear context and 
thereby give recommendations to technologists and policy makers pursuing nuclear waste siting 
and advanced fission or fusion-based reactors.  Although many of these recommendations have 
been made before,15 a renewed look is timely for at least three reasons.  First, recommendations 
for nuclear projects should be based on recent engagement research.  Second, as mentioned 
above, technologists and policy makers have a renewed interest in nuclear technologies for 
climate change mitigation.  There is an opportunity to inform their efforts.  Lastly, many 
longstanding engagement recommendations have yet to be implemented, especially with regards 
to nuclear waste disposal in the U.S.16  A discussion grounded on recent engagement research 
contributes to the ongoing debate.  
 This Chapter approaches engagement through the concept of a social license, a nebulous 
concept that represents “society’s consent” to a particular project or endeavor. 17  Under this 
approach, engagement, legal licensing, and other project development processes are collectively 
conceived of as contributing to the issuance of a social license.  Note that a social license is very 
different than a legal license.  While a legal license is granted through an established and formal 
procedure and typically memorialized through written permits, a social license is not formally 
granted and is not written.  Further, while a social license may require a legal license, the 
converse is generally not true.  In fact, because of the nebulous nature of a social license, project 
proponents are often not aware of whether they have been granted a social license until they 
 
14 Reed 2008, pp 2418, 2421; Reed et al. 2018. 
15 Slovic et al. 1991, pp 1606–1607. 
16 For example, some commentators recommend nearly twenty years ago that nuclear waste repositories be sited 
through a consent-based process.  Slovic et al. 1991, p 1607., citing E. R. Frech, in Proceedings of the 1991 
International High-Level Radioactive Waste Management Conference (American Nuclear Society, La Grange, IL, 
1991), vol. 1, pp. 442-446.  Yet, as further discussed below, present U.S. law does not use a consent-based process.   
17 Note that the terms a “social license” and a “license to operate” are often used interchangeable in the literature.  
Both terms are often used to describe all obligations that an activity must meet, including legal, economic and social.  
Gunningham et al. 2004, p 329.  This chapter adopts this meaning for a “social license,” so that a social license can 
equal or exceed legal obligations.  Other authors interpret a “social license” as necessarily separate and distinct from 
legal obligations.  Bankes 2015; Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen 2017.  For these authors, a “social 
license” refers only to obligations that go beyond the requirements of statutes, regulations, permits or treaties.  Id.  
What constitutes “society” and “consent” are context-dependent questions that are further discussed below. 
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either lose it or are confronted with the fact that they do not have it, through formal legal action, 
civil protest or other means.18 
 The remainder of the Chapter is organized into three sections: (i) an overview of the 
social license concept; (ii) an illustration of the social license concept through two nuclear waste 
repository case studies; and (iii) specific recommendations that would help facilitate a social 
license for nuclear waste repositories and advanced fission and fusion-based power plants.  
#.2 The Social License 
#.2.1 Background 
 The social license concept has been applied to a diverse set of endeavors funded by 
public and private sources, and subject to a wide range of regulatory oversight, including both 
voluntary codes of conduct and the full panoply of environmental regulations.  The social license 
concept explains why some projects are ultimately built while others languish and provides 
recommendations to proponents seeking to build new facilities.  It has been applied to extractive 
and other energy projects, such as mining, carbon capture and sequestration, and wind farms,19 
medical20 and other scientific research,21 genetic engineering,22 gain-of-function biological 
research,23 experimental ecological intervention,24 and environmental management generally.25  
In the context of industrial facilities, it has been defined as “the demands on and expectations for 
an [activity] that emerge from neighborhoods, environmental groups, community members, and 
other elements of the surrounding civil society.”26  Crucially, a social license pertains to more 
 
18 Rooney et al. 2014, p 209. 
19 Hall et al. 2015. 
20 Dixon-Woods and Ashcroft 2008; Carter et al. 2015. 
21 Raman and Mohr 2014. 
22 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016. 
23 National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity 2016.  Although the exact details of some types of gain-of-
function research is not public due to dual use concerns, the governing regulations were developed through public 
engagement and explicitly considered ethical values other than technical risks.   
24 For example, an experimental ecology project in Ontario, Canada, the Experimental Lakes Area, pays particular 
attention to societal concerns.  See https://www.iisd.org/. 
25 Note that the environmental management and conservation literature generally does not use the language of social 
license but has developed many similar concepts in the context of public engagement.  Fiorino 1990; Reed 2008; 
Reed et al. 2018. 
26 Gunningham et al. 2004, p 308. 
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than just strict environmental and economic harms and benefits – it also considers societal and 
political values.    
 The social license concept emphasizes process over outcomes.27  A social license is most 
likely to be granted and maintained, and projects are more likely to be completed, when 
community concerns are addressed in a meaningful process that opens expertise “to new 
questions and perspectives” rather than “letting people see the experts at work.”28  This process 
is more “bottom-up” than “top-down”; it is distinctly different than an expert-led technocratic 
approach to public concerns.29  Critically, proponents must consider what people actually worry 
about instead of what they should worry about.  Societal concerns must be meaningfully 
addressed: they cannot be dismissed out of hand by proponents or experts.  Rather, the processes 
of developing, approving or undertaking a project must be such that societal concerns are 
thoughtfully considered and analyzed.   
 This process does not mean that all concerns of all stakeholders are always placated.  
However, the process itself is a powerful method to acquire consent, even from those who may 
disagree with the ultimate outcome, by creating a sense of “procedural justice” whereby “people 
affected by decisions” are able to “participate in making” such decisions.30  A process of “good-
faith efforts toward respectful listening, creative compromise, and flexible practice”31 increases 
the legitimacy of a final decision32 and lessens opposition.  A meaningful process also fulfills a 
normative need to give citizens an opportunity to participate in decisions that affect themselves 
and their communities.33  
 A concrete example of how a bottom-up rather than a top-down process works in practice 
is provided by pulp mill factories that changed the order of their planning processes in order to 
facilitate a social license.  Before the factories adopted a social license approach, when 
considering an expansion or renovation, the factories would develop a plan, hire engineers to 
 
27 Rooney et al. 2014, p 215. 
28 Stilgoe et al. 2006, p 19; Raman and Mohr 2014, p 12. 
29 Fiorino 1990. 
30 Gwen Ottinger 2013. 
31 Gwen Ottinger 2013; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016, p 134.  
32 Fiorino 1990, p 228. 
33 Fiorino 1990, p 227.  National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016, p 133. 
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design the new facility, apply for necessary environmental permits, and then present the plan and 
permits to the community as a fait accompli.34  However, the factory found that this approach led 
to legal challenges to environmental permits that then slowed construction.35   
 Consequently, the factories reversed the order of their public engagement.  Before 
developing the construction plan and hiring engineers, the factories engaged with the local 
community to understand their concerns.36  Often, these concerns had little connection to 
environmental or health risk but rather pertained to odor or aesthetics, such as visible steam 
emissions.37  After listening to these concerns, the factories instructed the engineers to design the 
plant to take these concerns into account, by for example, eliminating steam emissions.38  The 
factory then submitted these designs to the appropriate regulators for legal approval.39  When the 
permits were granted, the community had already agreed.  The number of legal challenges fell 
dramatically and projects were completed more expeditiously.40   
The social license concept has several advantages for proponents, the public at large and 
regulators.  As the pulp mill example illustrates, focusing on consent facilitates expeditious 
pursuit by lessening opposition undertaken through legal action, legislation, civil protest or other 
means.  For communities and stakeholders, a focus on consent increases the likelihood that 
proponents will meaningfully address community concerns rather than expert concerns, even in 
the absence of government regulation pertaining to those concerns.41  Thus, the pulp mill above 
focused on aesthetics, a concern that regulators or engineers may have ignored otherwise.  For 
regulators, considering a social license in the construction of a regulatory regime ensures that 
 
34 Gunningham et al. 2004, p 327. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Gunningham et al. 2004, pp 318–319. 
38 Gunningham et al. 2004, p 327. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 For nuclear technologies, which are heavily regulated, government regulation with regards to health and safety 
likely addresses health and safety concerns.  However, there may be other values, such as the cultural significance of 
a power plant location, that government regulations is less able to address.  Note that some commentators argue that 
the social license concept undermines the rule of law by giving local communities veto authority over otherwise 
approved projects. Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen 2017.  In some respects, the tension between local 
veto and legal authority is analogous to the tension between minority and majority rights in a democracy: minority 
groups have some inalienable rights, regardless of majority decision by vote.  
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such regime is congruent with the requirements of a social license, and thereby helps project 
proponents achieve a social license.  For all parties, a social license approach can lead to higher 
quality decisions,42 almost as a form of peer review.   
 Although a social license is not a binding legal obligation, legally enforceable obligations 
are often a key component of a social license.43  In fact, in many, if not most, instances, social 
expectations exceed legal requirements.44  The fact that a social license can often exceed legal 
obligations has been used to explain otherwise disparate behavior.  For example, the social 
license concept can explain: (i) why some business enterprises undertake pollution control 
measures beyond their legal obligations;45 (ii) why local communities have been able to block 
mining and energy projects that otherwise were approved through a formal legal process;46 and 
(ii) why medical record data mining for public health purposes was terminated in the U.K.47   
Note that the social license concept is not a panacea to the challenges of building new 
nuclear facilities.  Project proponents adopting a social license approach are not guaranteed that 
the project will succeed.  In fact, quite the opposite.  Project proponents who undertake a social 
license approach must be genuinely open to the possibility that society, however defined for the 
particular project, will ultimately reject the project.48   
A social license approach alone also cannot overcome nuclear power’s contentious 
history.  Prior public opposition to nuclear projects, especially nuclear waste repositories, can be 
viewed as a “profound breakdown of trust in the scientific, governmental, and industrial 
managers of nuclear technologies.”49  Psychological research validates the common-sense view 
that trust, once lost, is slowly, if ever, regained.50  Thus, it would be naïve to presume that by 
simply adopting a social license approach, nuclear technologists can overcome decades of 
opposition.  The entrance of new proponents with new technologies and in the context of climate 
 
42 Reed 2008, p 2419.   
43 Gunningham et al. 2004, p 329. 
44 Gunningham et al. 2004, pp 308, 329. 
45 Gunningham et al. 2004, p 308. 
46 Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen 2017. 
47 Carter et al. 2015, p 2. 
48 Effective engagement requires that outcomes are “necessarily uncertain.”  Reed 2008, p 2426. 
49 Slovic et al. 1991, p 1606. 
50 Slovic et al. 1991, p 1606. 
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change may provide an opening to rebuild trust with the public through a social license approach 
that takes the establishment and maintenance of trust seriously.  However, it is also possible that 
even with a social license approach, trust cannot be rebuilt at this time.51  
A social license approach also cannot overcome the economic challenges facing nuclear 
technologies, which are substantial.  For example, in the U.S., existing nuclear plants are in 
many cases uneconomical to operate and many are either closing or seeking state subsidy to 
continue operating; only two new plants are currently under construction.52   
#.2.2 Society and Indicators of Consent 
 A social license is nebulous in part because both “society” and “consent” are nebulous 
themselves and context dependent.  For any given project, the definition of “society” and 
“consent” depend on the nature of the project and the cultural expectations of whatever defines 
“society” for that project.  In the environmental management literature, “society” for purposes of 
engagement, is often defined as “stakeholders,” typically defined as “individuals who either 
affect or are affected by a decision or action.”53  In some circumstances, stakeholders can include 
non-human or non-living entities and future generations.54  There is a field of inquiry, 
“stakeholder analysis,” devoted to developing methods for identifying and classifying 
stakeholders.55  Typically, stakeholders are identified before an engagement is undertaken, but in 
some cases, stakeholders are identified through an engagement process itself.56  For some types 
of activities, the definition of stakeholders is a simple geographic boundary,57  Jurisprudence 
regarding who can bring suit in court may be another source of inspiration for determining 
“society” for purposes of a social license.58  
 
51 Slovic et al. 1991, p 1606. 
52 Plumer 2018. 
53 Reed et al. 2009, p 1934.   
54 Reed 2008, p 2423. 
55 Reed et al. 2009. 
56 Reed 2008, p 2423. 
57 For example, the shoreline of an island hosting a genetically engineered mosquito trial, where the mosquito is not 
expected to leave the island, defined the boundary for societal consent via referendum. 
http://keysmosquito.org/oxitec-ox513a-trial/#1485203300201-22f823b0-92bd.  
58 For example, in U.S. federal court, litigants must demonstrate that (i) they have “suffered a concrete and 
particularized injury that is either actual or imminent”; (ii) “the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant”; and (iii) 
“a favorable decision will redress the injury.”  Mass. v. EPA 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007), citing Lujan v. Defenders of 
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 For nuclear activities, “society” or “stakeholders” are hard to define due to the ability of 
radioactive materials to travel long distances and the fact that long-lived radioisotopes have the 
potential to affect future generations.  Thus, “stakeholders” for a nuclear project likely includes 
far more than just individuals who live or work in the vicinity.  Individuals located hundreds of 
miles away from a fission-based nuclear plant may see themselves as stakeholders given the risk 
of a catastrophic accident spreading radioactive contamination.  Relatedly, individuals along 
nuclear material shipping routes may also see themselves as stakeholders in a decision to build 
nuclear facilities.  Thus, stakeholders for nuclear facilities depend on weather patterns, local 
hydrology, and shipping routes and likely can only be identified during engagement.  
 Defining stakeholders for nuclear facilities is further complicated by the fact that under 
normal operation nuclear facilities do not present a significant risk to people or the environment.  
It is only during accidents, which are rare, that nuclear facilities have the potential to cause harm.  
A conservative approach is to include as a stakeholder any individual at risk of being impacted 
by a catastrophic accident, no matter how small the risk.  A similar approach has been adopted 
by the International Law Commission with regards to transboundary harm in the environmental 
context,59 and by the Implementation Committee of the Espoo Convention, which has argued 
that notification to parties to the Convention is required “unless a risk of significant adverse 
transboundary impact can be excluded.”60  As a practical example of this approach, the Paks 
nuclear power facility in Hungary, when considering construction of two new nuclear reactors, 
notified and sought comment from citizens from all seven neighboring countries, Switzerland 
and all European member states.61   
 How the stakeholders view consent is a further question, which depends on the 
expectations of the stakeholders themselves and, unfortunately, cannot be answered in general.  
 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).  In a possible analogy to nuclear risks, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
future injuries to the state of Massachusetts caused by greenhouse gasses meet this three-part test.  Id. at 521. 
59 The International Law Commission has opined that risks of “causing significant transboundary harm” that trigger 
notification duties include “risks taking the form of a high probability of causing significant transboundary harm” 
and risks taking the form of “a low probability of causing disastrous transboundary harm.”  International Law 
Commission 2001, pp 5–6.  
60 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context Implementation Committee 2011 
Citing decision IV/2 annex I, para. 54. 
61 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2017, p 34.  
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While consent could be a vote of elected officials, or even a community-wide referendum,62 in 
some communities, it is conceivable that consent could be indicated by the assent of community 
elders.  Alternatively, consent could be indicated by “the absence of widespread disagreement.”63  
#.2.3 Key Principles  
 Because a social license focuses on public concerns rather than an expert assessment of 
risk, the exact procedures by which a social license is acquired and the concerns which it 
addresses depends on the activity seeking a social license.  Engagement procedures that are 
appropriate for one type of activity or one type of community may be inappropriate or even 
counter-productive for a different activity or different community.64  Furthermore, even for 
classes of activities for which best practice procedures have been established, the manner in 
which such procedures are followed are critical for success.65  Thus, a comprehensive discussion 
of the procedures that should be undertaken to acquire a social license cannot be taken out of the 
context of the activity that a proponent is undertaking.  Nevertheless, an analysis of prior projects 
that have successfully achieved a social license suggest that there are four generic principles: (i) 
engendering trust; (ii) transparency; (iii) meaningful public engagement; and (iv) protecting 
health, safety and the environment.   
#.2.3.1 Engendering Trust 
 A social license requires that proponents of an activity engender trust.66  The requirement 
pervades all other principles and informs how project processes should be implemented.  
Proponents must convince stakeholders that (i) “they can be trusted to do the things they say they 
 
62 A trial of a genetically modified mosquito in the Florida Keys exemplifies both techniques.  The local mosquito 
control board approved the trial and then put the trial to a local non-binding referendum.  Citizens on one island 
approved the trial, while citizens on another island declined.  The sponsoring private company and local mosquito 
control board then followed the results of the referendum.  See http://keysmosquito.org/oxitec-ox513a-
trial/#1485203300201-22f823b0-92bd.  
63 Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980, p 330. 
64 Reed 2008, p 2424. 
65 Reed 2008, p 2425. 
66 Rooney et al. 2014, p 210; Hall et al. 2015, p 306.  “Although there is no universally accepted definition of trust” 
trust is described as “having three main aspects: confidence, the belief that an individual or entity has the ability to 
do what they say they will do; integrity, the belief that an individual or entity is fair and just; and dependability, the 
belief that an individual or entity will do what they say they will do. Trust also depends on the available information 
that serves as the basis for judging these characteristics.”  National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine 2016, p 136. Citing  Hon and Grunig 1999.  
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will do;” (ii) that they are honest with respect to the risks, harms and benefits of a proposed 
activity; (iii) that they are honest with how they intend to address these risks, harms and benefits; 
and (iv) that they pursue their actions in good faith, i.e., that they do not have a hidden agenda.  
Crucially, trust, once lost, is hard, if not impossible, to regain.67   
#.2.3.2 Transparency 
 A social license further requires that project proponents are transparent.  Transparency is 
universally advised in the social license literature and supports the need to engender trust.68  
Transparency to some degree is also often a legal requirement for nuclear power plant 
permitting.69  Full transparency includes the sharing of all relevant information, including, inter 
alia, motivations, conflicts of interest, risks, and benefits.70  Transparency provides the 
information by which stakeholders can evaluate (i) whether proponents have the ability to “do 
what they say they will do”; (ii) whether proponents will in fact “do the things they say they will 
[do]”; (iii) whether proponents are “fair and just;” (iv) whether proponents are motivated by their 
publically stated reasons or some other, perhaps improper, justification; and (v) whether 
proponents have properly addressed social values and concerns.71   
 However, full transparency can be difficult for activities that implicate national security 
or trade secrets.  Project proponents may have a habit of withholding information.72  Further, 
regulations that facilitate or require public engagement may presume that some information is 
confidential.  In some cases, transparency may require a waiver from regulators.73   
 
67 Slovic et al. 1991, p 1606. 
68 Coglianese et al. 2008, p 927; Long and Scott 2013, p 49. (“To engender trust, the people or groups conducting or 
managing research should explain clearly what they are trying to accomplish, what they know and do not know, and 
the quality of the information [that] they have.  They should reveal intentions, point out vested interests, and admit 
mistakes, and do all of this in a way that is frank and understandable[.]”). 
69 For example, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires that all documents and correspondence relating to 
an application for a nuclear power plant construction permit and operating or combined license be made available to 
the public.   U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2004, p 1.  
70 According to one mining executive, a social license is best acquire by “show[ing] anyone anything.”  
Gunningham et al. 2004, p 327.  
71 Rooney et al. 2014, p 210; Hall et al. 2015, p 306; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 
2016, p 136. Coglianese et al. 2008, p 927. 
72 For example, the nuclear industry is often accused of having a habit of secrecy, stemming in part from its 
historical connection to weapon development and fear of public concern.  See Bickerstaffe p 326-327.  
73 For example, in a genetically engineered mosquito trial, the sponsoring company gave permission for the FDA to 
open its draft environmental assessment to public comment in order to facilitate effective public engagement.  
“Letter from Oxitec Ltd. To FDA DDM re: Draft Environmental Assessment for Investigational Use of Aedes 
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 Note that the manner and form of information release determines the extent to which 
transparency supports a social license.  Release of massive amounts of highly technical 
information will be likely perceived as an attempt to bury unflattering information under the 
cover of “transparency.”  Information must be released in a form that is easy to acquire, clearly 
articulated and easy to understand.74  For highly technical projects, such as nuclear, proponents 
may need to provide education75 or employ skilled facilitators who can “translate” technical 
information so that non-experts can effectively understand and participate.   
#.2.3.3 Meaningful Public Engagement 
 Public engagement is universally advised in the social license literature and is the 
essential feature of the social license approach.76  It is essential for engendering trust.  
Engagement is frequently discussed in the context of developing and deploying new 
technologies77  Engagement of some kind is also often a legal requirement of environmental,78 
administrative79 and international law.80  In the U.S., nuclear power plant permitting by the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires multiple public hearings and opportunities to 
comment, both orally and in writing, on site selection permits, environmental reviews, power 
plant design, construction permits, operating licenses, and combined licenses.81   
 
aegypti OX513A, available at https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2014-N-2235-1294.  The FDA is 
statutorily required to maintain the confidentiality of information submitted by research proponents, absent such a 
waiver.  21 CFR §§ 20.61(c), 25.50(b), 514.11.  
74 Coglianese et al. 2008, p 926. 
75 Reed 2008, p 2422.   
76 Coglianese et al. 2008. 
77 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016, p 131.  When discussing the benefits of a 
public process of review of gene transfer experiments, a National Academy report remarked that “By engaging the 
public in a focused discussion on the technology and its potential societal impacts, the RAC engendered trust and 
credibility.” Institute of Medicine 2014, p 5. 
78 In the U.S, federal agencies undertaking major actions that significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment must complete an environmental impact statement and must solicit comments from the public as part of 
competing such statement.  40 CFR §§ 1502.3, 1503.1(a)(4) (2018) and 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C).  
79 In the U.S., federal agencies are required to provide an opportunity for “interested persons” to participate in 
agency rulemaking proceedings through written comments and other means.  5 USC § 553(c) (2018).  
80 The Espoo Convention requires transboundary public engagement for projects that are “likely to cause a 
significant adverse transboundary impact.”  Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, Article 3.8.   
81 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2004. 
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 Although engagement is listed here third, it is recommended to be undertaken as early as 
possible, in order for proponents to understand societal concerns and to give proponents an early 
opportunity to shape their subsequent procedures to meet these concerns.82  Nonetheless, the 
effectiveness of public engagement in facilitating the acquisition of a social license depends 
critically on the manner in which public engagement is pursued.83  Ineffective public engagement 
can be counter-productive and breed public cynicism if it creates the impression that proponents 
are not genuinely interested in pursuing engagement or have something to hide.   
 Effective public engagement is more than simply accepting public comments or sharing 
intended plans or results.  It has been described as “seeking and facilitating the sharing and 
exchange of knowledge, perspectives, and preferences between or among groups who often have 
differences in expertise, power, and values.”84  Engagement cannot be a one-way lecture where 
proponents simply explain what they intend to do and why the public should accept the activity.  
Engagement in which members of the public are simply “educated” regarding a choice that has 
already been made, and asked to comment or vote, is often counterproductive as it instills a sense 
of condescension, or “paternalism of expertise.”85  Engagement must be a two-way conversation 
in which proponents learn from the public.  A two-way conversation can be challenging for 
technical projects, which have a tendency to use public engagement to let “people see the experts 
at work.”86  To counter this tendency, proponents should engage in meaningful discourse, dialog, 
and negotiation with stakeholders in a genuine process87 that (i) respects, acknowledges and 
takes into account divergent views and values;88 (ii) is inclusive and minimizes power 
differentials between stakeholder groups;89 and (iii) allows stakeholders to participate, to some 
degree, in the proponent’s decision making process.90  Engagement is also an ongoing process 
 
82 Reed 2008, p 2422. 
83 “The outcome of any participatory process is far more sensitive to the manner in which it is conducted than the 
tools that are used.”  Reed 2008, p 2425.   
84 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016, p 131. 
85 Bickerstaffe and Pearce 1980, p 323.  
86 Stilgoe et al. 2006, p 19; Raman and Mohr 2014, p 12. 
87 Rooney et al. 2014, p 214. 
88 Rooney et al. 2014, p 215. 
89 Reed 2008, p 2422; Rooney et al. 2014, p 214. 
90 Coglianese et al. 2008, p 926.   
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that is not limited to one time events; rather it is an iterative process that requires “attention to 
multiple types of communication, deliberation, relationship building, reflection, and 
empowerment.” 91   
 Crucially, engagement must be meaningful.  Proponents must offer a genuine opportunity 
to affect the course of a project.  Stakeholders must be sufficiently informed that they can offer 
substantive suggestions.92  Meaningful engagement is achieved through a process by which all 
interested stakeholders can participate and have their interests heard even-handedly.93  The 
process must demonstrate that proponents have undertaken “a good-faith effort toward respectful 
listening, creative compromise, and flexible practice.”94  Skilled facilitators can be useful to help 
translate technical information and mediate power and knowledge differentials between 
stakeholders and proponents.95   
 There are compelling practical reasons for proponents to pursue engagement.  First, 
proponents cannot learn what concerns are elicited by a proposed project without engagement.  
These concerns are often not self-evident.  Without public engagement, proponents can only 
guess what concerns the public has, or worse, only address proponent’s concerns.  The pulp mill 
example above, in which the community was most concerned with the aesthetic impact instead 
of the health and safety impacts, dramatically illustrates this point.  Second, engagement 
improves outcomes.  It provides a means of obtaining additional information96 and leads to better 
and more informed decisions due to the fact that non-experts, in some circumstances, are better 
able to judge risk than experts.97  Better decisions increases the likelihood that an activity will 
not harm health or the environment and will respect society’s values.  In turn, better and more 
 
91 Id. 
92 According to one engagement expert, “It is not enough simply to provide stakeholders with the opportunity to 
participate in decision-making […].  [T]hey must actually be able to participate.” Reed 2008, p 2422. 
93 Coglianese et al. 2008, p 927. 
94 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016, p 134. 
95 Reed 2008, pp 2422, 2425. 
96 Coglianese et al. 2008, p 927; National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016, p 133. 
97 Fiorino 1990, p 227.  Non-experts “see problems, issues, and solutions that experts miss.”  They have a sensitivity 
“to social and political values that experts’ models [do] not acknowledge.”  Id.  Further, they may have a better 
capacity for “accommodating uncertainty and correcting errors over time through deliberation and debate.”  Id. 
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informed outcomes create a positive feedback-loop that further engenders trust for future 
engagement.98  In effect, engagement acts as a form of peer review.   
#.2.3.4 Protecting Health, Safety and the Environment 
 The entity that seeks a social license must assess health, safety and environmental risks of 
a proposed activity, and either take steps to minimize such risk or abandon projects that pose too 
great of a risk.99  For nuclear projects, this principle often draws the most attention, debate and 
litigation.100  However, from a social license perspective, it is the least controversial as protection 
of health, safety and the environment is presumed.  
#.2.4 The Role of Regulation 
 Regulation has a strong role to play in facilitating the acquisition of a social license.  
Regulation can make explicit the means by which proponents address societal concerns and 
expectations, thereby freeing project proponents from conducting their own evaluation.  
Regulation can also assign responsibilities for adhering to different principles of a social license.  
For example, regulation can require government agencies to undertake engagement as part of 
issuing a legal permit or license.  Regulation can standardize procedures for classes of similar 
types of projects, such human subject research.  Perhaps most critically, regulation can engender 
trust by enforcing, through civil or criminal penalty, transparency, public engagement, and 
health, safety and environmental protection.  
 On the other hand, regulation can also impair a social license.  For example, regulation or 
legislation that specifies a controversial end result, such as the location of a nuclear waste 
repository, is likely to be counterproductive as such specificity impairs genuine public 
engagement and may lead stakeholders to undertake legal or other action outside of the 
engagement process.101   
 
98 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016, p 135. 
99 Gunningham et al. 2004, p 314; Rooney et al. 2014, p 210. 
100 For example, nuclear power advocates occasionally argue that existing health, safety and environmental 
regulations are excessively expensive and stifle innovation.  See Institute for Energy Research 2018.   
101 See the nuclear waste repository case studies below.  
Page 17 of 29 
 Further, it should be emphasized that regulatory compliance alone is not sufficient in 
itself for an activity to achieve a social license. 102  There is a risk, especially for heavily 
regulated activities like nuclear, that proponents and governments become lulled into a false 
sense of security with regard to a social license through regulatory compliance.  Regulation can 
be inflexible, leading to an out-of-date regulatory regime that is unable to meet society’s 
expectations.  New types of societal concerns or new safety risks may arise that were not 
contemplated when regulations were created.  Regulation may not include sufficient 
transparency, or the public engagement specified by regulation may not meet the unique 
circumstances of the activity or the community hosting the project.  Moreover, regulation may 
not provide a means of assessing society’s “consent.”   
 There are many examples of projects that undertake measures beyond regulatory 
compliance.  In fact, a defining characteristic of the social license approach is to ask what else 
should be done.  Thus, the pulp mill mentioned above undertook engagement prior to applying 
for a permit and addressed concerns, such as aesthetics, that are not related to health or safety 
regulations.  As another example, a genetically modified mosquito trial waived its right to a 
confidential environmental impact statement in order to facilitate meaningful public comment,103 
and sought approval from residents of the island hosting the trial through a vote of public 
officials and a non-binding referendum,104 neither of which were required under federal 
regulations for genetically engineered organisms.105   
#.2.5 The Role of Project Proponents and Governments 
 A critical question for the social license approach is which entity or entities takes 
responsibility for addressing society’s concerns and achieving society’s consent.  In particular, 
who has responsibility for: (i) evaluating whether compliance with existing regulations is 
sufficient for a social license or whether additional actions or procedures are necessary; (ii) 
undertaking engagement and disclosing relevant materials; and (iii) ultimately determining 
 
102 Gunningham et al. 2004, pp 308, 329. 
103 Supra note 73. 
104 Supra note 62. 
105 For this particular trial, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration exercised regulatory oversight under its authority 
over animal drugs.  U.S. FDA, Center for Veterinary Medicine 2017, p 6.  FDA approval was conditioned on an 
environmental assessment and a determination that the investigation was neither unsafe nor “otherwise contrary to 
the public interest.” Id. FDA regulations do not discuss local community acceptance.  
Page 18 of 29 
whether consent has been achieved.  Typically, these responsibilities are divided between project 
proponents, i.e., the entity that will actually undertake the project, and government agencies, 
which either regulate or provide financial funding.  Note that there are also cases in which the 
government itself is the project proponent.   
 For heavily regulated or particularly risky activities, such as nuclear technologies, there is 
perhaps a tendency for a governmental actor to take primary responsibility for all aspects of a 
social license, either by crafting appropriate regulation or by direct action, including 
promulgating information and undertaking public engagement.  A strong governmental role has 
at least four advantages.  First, a governmental role frees proponents to focus on their particular 
expertise.  This advantage is particularly pertinent for classes of projects that would be 
overwhelmed by achieving a social license, such as academic research.  Second, governments 
have a unique ability to garner resources and advice to evaluate risks, some of which, such as 
national security, only governments can truly evaluate.  Third, governments have a unique ability 
and resources to undertake public engagement.  Fourth, governments, through their enforcement 
power, can engender trust, especial with regards to health, safety and environmental protection.  
 On the other hand, there are at least three disadvantages for placing responsibility on 
governments.  First, as mentioned before, governments can be less agile than non-governmental 
actors and slower at responding to changing social expectations, either because of bureaucratic 
inertia or legal constraints.  Second, national government actors or regulation may not be 
sensitive to local concerns.  Third, government involvement can exacerbate power differences 
between proponents and society, to the detriment of meaningful and effective engagement.  
 Often, responsibilities for a social license are shared between project proponents and 
governments.  For large, novel, unique, or controversial projects, for which social concerns and 
effective engagement procedures are uncertain at the outset of the project, the proponent often 
takes prime responsibility for securing the social license, supported by a governmental role to 
ensure health, safety and environmental protection.  For example, a genetically engineered 
mosquito trial went beyond regulatory requirements for transparency, engagement and 
consent.106  On the other hand, for routine and repeated activities, the government often takes the 
lead by creating regulations or codes of conduct.  For example, both publicly and privately 
 
106 Supra note 62, 73. 
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funded human subject research in the U.S. is governed by regulations and codes-of-conduct 
requiring local Institutional Review Board approval.107  A social license for human subject 
research is achieved, in part, through public engagement in the creation and periodic revision of 
these regulations108 and though the operation of Institutional Review Boards. 
#.3 Nuclear Case Studies 
 The history of nuclear waste repositories illustrates the social license concept, especially 
as it pertains to nuclear technologies. 
#.3.1 Yucca Mountain Waste Repository 
 The story of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository in the U.S. state of Nevada 
illustrates how neglecting a social license approach can imperil a project.  Since 1983, the U.S. 
Department of Energy (“U.S. DOE”) has spent more than $13 billion evaluating the safety of 
Yucca Mountain.109  Nevertheless, the repository remains in limbo.  In 2010, the U.S. DOE 
withdrew its application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; however, a recent budget 
proposal has revived the repository’s prospects.110   
 Explanations for Yucca Mountain’s failure have been widely discussed and include the 
challenges of the geology,111 the manner by which the DOE engaged, or did not engage, with the 
Nevada public, and the lack of consent by the State of Nevada to the site selection process.112  
Another explanation is that the U.S. Congress made it difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. 
 
107 See 82 FR 7149 (January 19, 2017) and 45 CFR §§ 46.101, 122, 123.  Strictly speaking, U.S. federal regulations 
on human subject research only pertain to those projects funded by the U.S. federal government.  However, most 
institutions adopt these regulations as their own rules, regardless of funding source.  See for example, 
https://cuhs.harvard.edu/procedures/institutional-authority.  In addition, the U.S. FDA requires studies submitted in 
support of a new drug or medical device to have been conducted in conformance with federal human subject 
research regulations.  21 CFR 56.103 (2018). 
108 Human subject research regulations in the U.S. were recently revised in 2017 using a public engagement process. 
82 FR 7149 (January 19, 2017).  Before 2018, they were most recently revised in 2005.  Id. 
109 Katherine Ling, NY Times, “Budget Will Eliminate Yucca Nuclear Waste Repository Says Sen. Reid.” February 
1, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/02/01/01greenwire-budget-will-eliminate-yucca-nuclear-waste-repos-
9897.html; Ewing and Hippel 2009. 
110 Zhang 2017. 
111 Yucca Mountain is pervaded by geologic fractures that could transport radioactive materials to the local aquifer.  
Murphy 2006, p 49.  There is a 5% chance that the radiation dose by contaminates in the aquifer will double an 
individual’s annual radiation exposure.  Whipple 2006, p 61. 
112 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future 2012, p 23.; Ewing and Hippel 2009, p 151. 
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DOE to secure a social license.  Under the 1987 Amendment to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 
(“NWPA”), Congress designated Yucca Mountain as the sole location for a nuclear waste 
repository.113  The U.S. Department of Energy (“US DOE”) was tasked with evaluating the 
health and safety of such storage, subject to confirmation by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (“NRC”) and Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).114  If these agencies 
agreed, the US DOE was to construct and operate the repository.  This siting process focused 
exclusively on health, safety and environmental protection and neglected the other principles 
required for a social license.115  This focus was counter-productive.  The emphasis on science 
blinded the US DOE leadership and the US Congress to the real issue facing the repository: 
whether Nevada was willing to host the repository, even if it was established to be safe.  
Residents and government officials in Nevada were never supportive of the repository.  
Opposition was so fierce, that at one point the state denied a water permit for bore-hole drilling 
and the DOE sued in federal court to enjoin Nevada from enforcing its own water laws.116   
 The siting process also precluded meaningful engagement.  Because Congress legislated 
that the repository would be at Yucca Mountain as long as experts deemed it safe, there was no 
meaningful role for public input.  Regardless of public comment, if the U.S. DOE, NRC and 
EPA determined that the repository would be safe, it would be built.  This meant that public 
engagement that did took place117 was merely an opportunity to let “people see the experts at 
work” rather than opening up “expertise to new questions and perspectives.”118   
#.3.2 Swedish & Finnish Waste Repositories 
 In contrast to the U.S., Sweden and Finland explicitly adopted a social license approach 
and have had a comparative success.  The Finnish repository at Olkiluoto is now under 
 
113 Cotton 2006, p 36.; Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and as amended 1987, 42 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. (2017).  
114 Id. 
115 Dawn Stover, “The “scientization” of Yucca Mountain”  12 October, 2011. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 
Available at https://thebulletin.org/scientization-yucca-mountain.   
116 See U.S. vs. Nevada, No. 2:00-CV-0268-RLH-LRL, ORDER on Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction-#120 
(D. Nev. August 31, 2007), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/nuclear/yucca/documents/AG-155-2007-
000513.pdf. 
117 The DOE undertake numerous public engagement events.  For example, between May and August of 2001 alone 
the DOE held 66 public hearings.  U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works Majority Staff 2006. 
118 Raman and Mohr 2014, pp 10, 12. 
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construction119 and the Swedish repository at Forsmark is pending licensing approval.120  
Although both nations began their site selection process by focusing on technical issues, they 
realized that local consent was as important, if not more important, than technical viability.121   
 In Sweden, the nuclear waste company, SKB, sought community consent for preliminary 
study from all 286 Swedish municipalities; three agreed.122  SKB also performed feasibility 
studies in five municipalities that were already hosting a nuclear facility.123  In 2000, eight sites 
in total were identified as technically and socially suitable for further investigation; two of these 
sites were selected and consented to in-further study.124  In 2009, SKB selected Forsmark due to 
superior geology.125  In 2011, SKB submitted the application for construction to the Swedish 
Radiation Safety Authority and the Environmental Court.126 
 In Finland, the nuclear waste company, Posiva, took a slightly different approach, but 
with the same result.  After extensive geological surveys of Finland, Posiva selected four 
locations for further study.127  A full environmental impact assessment was conducted for each 
location.128  Crucially, each location and surrounding communities were given a veto over a final 
siting decision.129  At the conclusion of the environmental impact assessment and a public 
 
119 Fountain 2017.  
120 http://www.skb.com/news/a-week-in-osthammar-with-focus-on-the-environment/  
121 In 1985, the Swedish nuclear waste company, SKB, drilled exploratory bore-holes at 10 locations throughout 
Sweden.  Lidskog and Sundqvist 2004.  Local opposition to the drilling, however, led SKB to change its strategy: 
instead of focusing on the best site at the start of the process, the company decided to focus on many suitable sites 
that were all socially acceptable.  Id. at 261.  As explained by SKB: “The site where the final repository is built must 
fulfill two fundamental requirements: There must be bedrock that permits long-term safe disposal, and there must be 
political and popular support in the concerned municipality and among nearby residents.”  Swedish Nuclear Fuel 
and Waste Management Company 2011, p 19.  According to Timo Aikas, a former executive of the Finish nuclear 
waste company, Posiva, initially, “[Posiva] ran into difficulties because we tried to behave as industry did back then 
– we’d decide and announce. […] Very soon we learned that we had to be very open.  […] This openness and 
transparency creates trust.”  Fountain 2017. 
122 Lidskog and Sundqvist 2004, p 261. 
123 Id. at 262.  
124 Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company 2011, pp 19–20. 
125 Id.  
126 http://www.skb.com/future-projects/the-spent-fuel-repository/our-applications/  
127 The final disposal facility for spent nuclear fuel, At 4-7.  
http://www.posiva.fi/files/738/The_final_disposal_facility_for_spent_nuclear_fuel_small.pdf.  
128 Id. 
129 Curry 2017.  
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engagement process, two communities expressed the highest interest in hosting a repository.130  
Of these, Olkiluoto was proposed in 1999 because of the larger geographic area available and the 
fact that more spent fuel was already located near the proposed site.131  The location was ratified 
by the Finish parliament in May 2001 and a construction license was granted in 2015.132  
#.4 Application to Nuclear Technologies 
#.4.1 Nuclear Waste Siting 
 The nuclear waste repository case studies illustrate the importance of consent and 
meaningful engagement, both points that have been made before.133  The social license 
discussion leads to five concrete recommendations to achieve a social license: 
 First, in the U.S., nuclear power proponents should not advocate for Yucca Mountain.  
Yucca Mountain may be a safe location for nuclear waste.  However, the prior process has 
impaired trust to such an extent that societal consent will likely never be achieved under the 
current mandated process.  Thus, any attempt to revive Yucca Mountain, absent a complete 
restart in the siting process, is likely to be counter-productive to nuclear waste disposal. 
 Second, a governmental agency should not take prime responsibility for a nuclear waste 
repository.  A governmental agency should be responsible for protecting health, safety and the 
environment, and may have a role to play in facilitating engagement.  But it should not be 
primarily responsible for the social license.  Nuclear waste repositories are new, large, and 
unique.  Although the key principles of a social license are well established, societal concerns 
and effective procedures are uncertain and influx.  Thus, the project proponent needs to be 
nimble and learn from its experience as engagement proceeds – it cannot be constrained by a 
process that is created a priori through regulation or legislation.  Both Sweden and Finland 
adjusted their siting process over the decades that they pursued their repositories.  This flexibility 
was possible, in part, because both Swedish and Finish nuclear power utilities were responsible 
for siting their waste repositories rather than the Swedish or Finish governments.134   
 
130 http://www.posiva.fi/en/final_disposal/selecting_the_site_the_final_disposal_at_olkiluoto#.Wk6JGbenGDI.  
131 Id. 
132 http://www.posiva.fi/en/final_disposal/general_time_schedule_for_final_disposal#.Wk6VF7enGDI.  
133 Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future 2012. 
134 The Swedish and Finnish governments were heavily involved in assessing health and safety.  
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 Furthermore, given the long history of nuclear technology’s connections to government 
weapons programs that had limited, if any, public input, a non-governmental proponent is likely 
to have more credibility with regards to meaningful engagement.  The power difference between 
a non-governmental proponent and host community is far less than a national government.  In 
this context, engagement between a non-governmental proponent and stakeholders is more likely 
to be perceived as a true conversation rather than a one-way lecture.  The danger of power 
differences is apparent in the Yucca Mountain example.  In a dispute over water rights during 
technical feasibility studies, the U.S. DOE claimed that the Nuclear Waste Policy Act pre-
empted Nevada’s water laws,135 essentially sending a message that the DOE would use its 
authority to do whatever it saw fit, regardless of local concerns, undercutting public engagement 
and trust.  A non-governmental entity does not have such authority to override a local 
community’s own policies, and thus, would not be able to exercise such blatant power.   
 Third, proponents should only undertake studies in willing communities.136  Consent at 
the start of the siting process will facilitate future engagement.  Seeking consent before 
evaluation is also a good-faith gesture on the part of proponents that will engender trust.  
 Fourth, at least two sites should be evaluated to the same level of detail before a final site 
is selected.  The in-depth technical evaluation of at least two sites in Finland and Sweden likely 
made selection of one location possible.  Although multiple evaluations may appear inefficient, 
multiple sites signals to communities that they have a genuine choice with regards to the 
repository – other options are available if a community choses to not host a repository.   
 Fifth, communities should always have a veto over a siting decision.137  Like “consent,” a 
veto is nebulous and depends on the context of the community that is considering a repository.  
Elected officials, leaders, or a community vote may wield the veto.  Nevertheless, a veto 
complements the advantages of multiple site investigations and further strengthens the 
meaningfulness of public engagement.  For example, a veto means that if a proponent neglects 
public comments, a community can reject the project.   
 
135 U.S. v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 699 (9th Cir. 2001).  
136 However, a preliminary geologic screen of suitable communities likely does not require community consent to 
the extent that such screening requires limited, if any, sampling or drilling.  
137 In the event that no community agrees to host a waste repository, the siting process would need to begin again.  
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#.5.2 Advanced Fission and Fusion Power Plants 
 Many startups and academic groups are pursuing novel fission and fusion power plant 
designs.  Although none of these designs are near operational, it is prudent for researchers and 
developers to begin thinking about how to secure a social license for future commercial power 
plants, if their research is successful, and thus, avoid some of the controversies that have long 
plagued nuclear technologies.  Fission and fusion are very different technologies that pose very 
different waste, accident and non-proliferation risks.  The precise means by which either 
technology secures a social license, and the regulatory mechanisms that are most appropriate for 
either technology’s specific risks are likely very different.  Nevertheless, the discussion above 
suggests the following four high-level recommendations that apply to either fission or fusion-
based reactors for securing a social license:  First, the advanced fission and fusion communities 
should embrace responsibility for achieving a social license and not rely on regulatory 
compliance alone.  This means that they should (i) evaluate the extent to which existing laws and 
regulations are effective in facilitating a social license; (ii) think critically about the role of 
government in securing a social license; (iii) take actions themselves, in light of the role of 
government, to secure a social license; and (vi) propose regulatory reforms that complement their 
efforts and that would help facilitate a social license.   
 Second, because a social license requires a sensitivity to public concerns rather than 
expert concerns, the advanced fission and fusion communities should solicit and listen to 
concerns of the public.  For example, the public may have more worry than experts with regards 
to waste disposal, radioactive material storage and transport, the risk of fires and explosions, 
whether caused by an accident or sabotage, and the risk of increasing nuclear proliferation.  
Regardless of how experts feel about these issues, the advanced fission and fusion communities 
should take them seriously through both engineering design and the development of regulation 
appropriate for these concerns. 
 Third, following the nuclear waste siting discussion, advanced nuclear plants, whether 
research, demonstration or commercial, should only be sited in communities that actively 
welcome these facilities.  Forcing a community to host a new facility is likely to be counter-
productive for either industry as a whole. 
 Lastly, fission and fusion proponents should embrace stewardship of the entire lifecycle 
of their technology, including waste disposal and plant decommissioning.  A longstanding and 
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principle concern for nuclear power plants has always been disposal of waste and 
decommissioning of plants.  In order to secure a social license, advanced nuclear power 
technologies, whether fission or fusion-based, will need to directly address this concern. 
Advanced fission proponents will need a strategy in light of the challenge of disposing of spent 
fuel from existing fission plants, and in the U.S., the need to distance themselves from Yucca 
Mountain.  Fusion will not be immune from this concern, even if the amount of waste is smaller 
and the waste itself radioactive for a far shorter duration than fission.  If fusion becomes 
commercially viable, the fusion industry can address this concern head-on by including waste 
disposal and decommissioning in their business plans.  For example, companies operating fusion 
plants could set-aside funds for disposal and decommissioning.  Companies could start planning 
for decommissioning and disposal at the same time that plants are under design and 
construction.138  Such plans could include, for example, subsidiaries or collaborations that start 
the siting process for their particular waste needs at the same time, or even before, commercial 
fusion construction. 
#.5 Conclusion 
 This Chapter has provided an overview of the concept of a social license, used the 
concept to explain why some nuclear waste repositories are under construction while others have 
failed, and detailed concrete recommendations for future nuclear waste repositories and 
advanced fission and fusion-based power plants to secure a social license.  The analysis 
presented here suggests that addressing societal concerns, whatever they may be, through a 
meaningful and transparent engagement process that engenders trust, is as important as technical 
innovation in order for nuclear technologies have a role in responding to climate change.   
 Suggestions for meaningful public engagement are not new.  However, experience in 
fields other than nuclear provides insight into how nuclear technologists can best secure a social 
license.  The analysis presented in this Chapter leads to four high-level lessons for nuclear 
technologists:  First, technologists cannot rely on government regulators to secure the social 
license on their behalf; technologists must take responsibility for securing the social license for 
themselves, with support from government regulation and government agencies.  This means that 
 
138 In some circumstances, it may even be possible to co-locate fusion plants and waste disposal facilities to 
minimize transport of radioactive material.   
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proponents should be prepared to go beyond regulatory requirements for safety, waste disposal, 
engagement, transparency, and other stakeholder concerns.  Second, while being prepared to go 
beyond government regulation, technologists should also consider how government regulation 
can support a social license, not just by addressing health, safety and environmental concerns, 
but also by addressing other concerns, such as the management of nuclear waste, and advocate 
for such regulation.  Third, because the manner in which engagement is conducted is far more 
important than the tools used for engagement, technologists should craft the engagement process 
for any particular project to meet the unique circumstances of the project and the stakeholders 
involved.  Participating stakeholders should be given the knowledge and tools they need to make 
informed comments, facilitators should be used to overcome knowledge and power differences, 
and project proponents should be genuinely open and respond to stakeholder input.  Lastly, 
technologists should embrace responsibility for a social license for their technology’s full life 
cycle.  A common critique of nuclear technologies is that it forces future generations to deal with 
waste generated today.  In order to secure a social license, technologists will need to directly 
address this concern.  
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